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Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 05:21:45
From: Space Digest maintainer <digests@isu.isunet.edu>
Reply-To: Space-request@isu.isunet.edu
Subject: Space Digest V16 #694
To: Space Digest Readers
Precedence: bulk
Space Digest Mon, 7 Jun 93 Volume 16 : Issue 694
Today's Topics:
1992 NASA Authorization Budget- shuttle
Comet Mining
Electronic Journal of the ASA (EJASA) - June 1993 [Part 2]
Hey Sherz! (For real!) Cost of LEO (Long)
LE-7 orrection (was Re: Hey Sherz!...)
manifest destiny = US getting uppity again
mass drivers
Why are SSTO up-front costs rising? (4 msgs)
Welcome to the Space Digest!! Please send your messages to
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: 6 Jun 1993 16:03:21 -0400
From: Matthew DeLuca <matthew@oit.gatech.edu>
Subject: 1992 NASA Authorization Budget- shuttle
Newsgroups: sci.space
In article <1993Jun6.180328.23003@iti.org> aws@iti.org (Allen W. Sherzer) writes:
>In article <1uofnrINNdhs@phantom.gatech.edu> matthew@phantom.gatech.edu (Matthew DeLuca) writes:
>>Depends on what you mean by 'defend'. Sure, a Ken-style defense of
>>the Shuttle is not a good thing, but saying "Yes, the Shuttle is expensive
>>but we know that we can do better, and we'd like to keep it flying until
>>we get this lower-cost (whip out the plans here) replacement going" may be
>>quite constructive.
>And the answer is: "see, I told you, they know it's expensive and doesn't
>work well, but they STILL back it because it's pork for their special
>interest!". Saying 'we know it's too expensive but let's fly it anyway'
>only plays into their hands.
The critical point in what I said above is the implicit statement that the
Shuttle is *not* an eternal pork barrel, but a program with an end. If the
replacement burns less money, it is hard to justify it as pork barreling.
Of course, lack of pork may mean it doesn't get through Congress, but that
is another problem.
>>[You have to be nuts to contract out to the Russians]
>Sorry, but that's the trend.
Well, hopefully this trend will stop soon. In case nobody has noticed, the
Russian economy is *still* imploding; it may eventually reach a point where
it can't sustain a space program in the manner that it has in the past, and
then where will we be?
>>Further, I doubt anyone in their right
>>mind is simply going to abandon the manned space field to the Russians;
>>there are factors other than strictly economic at work here.
>Get with the program guy! The cold war is over. That stuff doesn't work
>any more.
I'm not concerned with the Russians getting a technological edge or anything
and blowing us away, I am concerned with us giving up a field that could
hurt us economically down the road. If you abandon a field (electronics,
cars, aerospace, whatever) then it is a certainty that you will never make
a penny off of it.
>No, I have changed my mind in recent weeks. Now, I don't think it is
>politically possible at this time so I'm not going to act on it, but for
>the reasons I have stated above, flying Shuttle only helps our enemies and
>hurts us over the long run.
If you keep flying it forever, sure, it will hurt. Nobody is advocating
flying it forever, just advocating not making the exact same mistake we
made after Apollo.
--
Matthew DeLuca
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta Georgia, 30332
uucp: ...!{decvax,hplabs,ncar,purdue,rutgers}!gatech!prism!matthew
Internet: matthew@phantom.gatech.edu
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 1993 20:39:41 GMT
From: Nick Janow <Nick_Janow@mindlink.bc.ca>
Subject: Comet Mining
Newsgroups: sci.space
gary@ke4zv.uucp (Gary Coffman) writes:
> If we treat a comet fragment as a whole body problem instead, we can use
> fractional distillation to extract light volatiles and capture them in the
> bag's cold trap. If moderately fine temperature control is possible, well
> refined materials will result.
Unfortunately, the comet outgasses unpredictably and puffs a few chunks of
dark material on one side of the bag, and reflective material on the other.
Ice crystals form in a patch elsewhere, messing up your ideal "warm the comet
in a bag" system even more. If you could just scrape that patch of gunk off
that side... Meanwhile, the bag was bouncing around (due to chunks hitting
the sides unevenly) and is now stuck fast to one side of the comet; the wrong
side.
These problems can be solved, but I wanted to point out that comet mining
isn't quite as trivial a task as you seem to imply.
--
Nick_Janow@mindlink.bc.ca
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 1993 19:09:46 GMT
From: Larry Klaes <klaes@verga.enet.dec.com>
Subject: Electronic Journal of the ASA (EJASA) - June 1993 [Part 2]
Newsgroups: sci.astro,sci.space,sci.misc,sci.classics,sci.archaeology,alt.sci.planetary
physics. Peter is also a consultant to International Astronomical
Union (IAU) Commission 22 (Meteors and Interplanetary Dust). He
is a council member and secretary-treasurer for the North American
section of the International Meteor Organization (IMO). Peter has
been interested in meteor astronomy for fourteen years. His first
observations were of the 1980 Perseids at age nine.
COMETARY CONUNDRUMS
by M. Leon Knott
Copied with permission from the April 1993 issue of the East
Valley Astronomy Club (EVAC) newsletter. Courtesy of Paul Dickson
(Dickson@SYSTEM-M.AZ05.BULL.COM), Editor of the Saguaro Astronomy
Club's newsletter, SACNews, in Phoenix, Arizona.
The return of long-awaited comet Swift-Tuttle in 1992 was very big
news for amateur astronomers. In fact, it is likely that Swift-Tuttle
was the second most observed comet in recent years, following, of
course, comet Halley. This is only to be expected, for we know that
something resides in humans - and in amateurs in particularly large
doses - that serves to kindle a kind of compulsion to look upon and
experience these mysterious vagabonds of space. This compulsion
probably springs forth from several roots, including questions as to
the very nature of comets, a long history of superstition in relation
to comets, and perhaps even the aura of mystery and wonder that sur-
rounds past and present comet hunters. The superb program by comet
hunter David Levy at the East Valley Astronomy Club's (EVAC) March
of 1993 meeting merely served to heighten this sense of wonder and
mystery.
However, even a quick look at the appearance and behavior of
historical comets from the shrouded mists of antiquity will swiftly
banish any thought as to our knowing all the answers. Comets have
run the gamut from tiny, star-like apparitions with no tails to hazy
ghosts with tails stretching well over ninety degrees (comet Messier,
1759). Red comets, blue comets (Comets of 1362 and 1468), yellow
(Comet of 1577), and white (Comet of 1462) comets have all been
observed over the centuries. Comets have appeared and remained
visible for months at a time (comet van Gent 1944-1945), while others
have appeared and traversed the skies at the rate of forty degrees
per day (Comet of 1472)! Others have been visible in broad daylight
for days on end (Comet 1402, visible in daylight for seven days).
With upwards of nearly seven hundred comets on the books, it is
only to be expected that we would see such an incredible diversity
as to appearances, speeds, positions, tails, and so on. Matching or
exceeding that diversity is the fascinating saga of comet discovery.
Comets have been discovered under nearly every conceivable circum-
stance throughout the years, and the telling of these stories make
thoroughly satisfying and entertaining reading. After all, fame and
glory have attended the successful comet hunters of the past and
present. We thrill to think of their dedication and skill while given
to the pursuit of being the very first person on Earth to see a new
comet. At the same time, injustices have occurred, leaving certain
comet hunters unknown and unheralded. Much of the reason for these
injustices derives from the way in which comets are named and credit
for discovery is given.
Interestingly enough, the first comet to bear the name of its
discoverer was Comet 1759 II, discovered by and credited to the
up-and-coming comet hunter Charles Messier. It should be noted
that this comet is the first to bear the name of its discoverer on
a modern day basis. It may well have been called by some other
name during its apparition.
This discovery, Messier's first, was made on January 26, 1759. On
May 26, 1758, less than one year earlier, comet hunter de la Nux, on
Bourbon Island in the Indian Ocean, discovered the last comet to bear
a generic or dated name. It was, of course, the Comet of 1758, and de
la Nux could be forgiven a slight case of ire at being deprived of
having the comet carry his name. However, de la Nux was in for even
more disappointment along these lines.
Messier followed up this first success with four more discoveries
of comets in 1763, 1764, 1766, and 1769. He also discovered a comet
on January 10, 1771, but was bumped from first place by his old
competitor de la Nux. However, de la Nux was fated to lose his
namesake to another, a "greater". The comet that should have borne
the name Comet de la Nux was seen by millions and was very quickly
christened the Great Comet by the public at large. At this point, two
comets discovered by de la Nux were wandering in space bearing names
other than his.
Messier once again made a series of discoveries with comets in
1771, 1773, and 1780. De la Nux was unheard of again until December
of 1783, when he discovered his third and last comet. The practice of
naming comets after their discoverers was by then a twenty-five year
old tradition and de la Nux had every reason for assuming the new
discovery would bear his name. Imagine his consternation when once
again, his discovery ended up bearing the name the Great Comet.
Three comets discovered by de la Nux were now traversing the
limits of the solar system and not one of them carried its discoverer's
name. Compounding the puzzle is the fact that neither of the Great
Comets were by any stretch of the imagination "great". Both bore tails
a maximum of six degrees long and both reached a maximum brightness of
only magnitude five. Messier's comet of 1759 reached a brightness of
magnitude three and possessed a tail, at one point, of 98 degrees in
length. Actually, it was seen over quite a long period with a tail in
excess of forty degrees. This "great" comet bore Messier's name and
was *not* known as the Great Comet of 1759.
Another interesting chapter in the book of comet discoveries was
written by astronomers at the Skainate-Pleso Observatory in the years
following the Second World War. Beginning in 1947, with a pair of war
surplus 25x100 binoculars, the staff of the observatory executed a
routine comet search every available opportunity. Over the course of
twelve years (1947 to 1959), these searches were responsible for
fourteen comet discoveries.
Comets bearing the names Mrkos, Pajdusakova, Becvar, Kresak, and
Vozarova were all discovered during the routine observational program.
Kresak, Becvar, and Vozarova each discovered one comet, Pajdusakova
discovered three, and Mrkos discovered or shared the discovery of
eight comets. That these comets were all discovered by astronomers
using binoculars is elegant testimony to the fact that diligence and
dedication are more important than equipment and that making a search
program "routine" is of the utmost importance.
The Skainate-Pleso comet hunting program was so successful that it
cries out for emulation. It is quite possible that a small group of
dedicated amateurs, following a well-designed search program, could
very well match or exceed this record, especially in light of the
ready availability of vastly larger and improved optical instruments.
The final chapters in comet hunting have yet to be written. I
can think of a no more exciting and interesting field in which to
put forth effort than that of discovering more of these mysterious
objects. Such an effort might actually result in discoveries worthy
of bearing the name "Great Comet". I suppose that would be okay.
Then again, wouldn't something along the lines of the "Great Comet
Knott", or "Great Comet (fill in the blank)" have a much more
sonorous ring to it?
About the Author -
M. Leon Knott is an amateur astronomer interested in observing and
telescope making. Recently from the U.S. East Coast, he is now living
in Mesa, Arizona. He has written for SKY & TELESCOPE, ASTRONOMY, THE
MOTHER EARTH NEWS MAGAZINE, and TELESCOPE MAKING. In addition he is
an Associate Editor of the new AMATEUR TELESCOPE MAKERS JOURNAL and
Newsletter Editor for the East Valley Astronomy Club (EVAC).
THE ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY OF THE ATLANTIC
June 1993 - Vol. 4, No. 11
Copyright (c) 1993 - ASA
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 1993 19:04:40 GMT
From: "Allen W. Sherzer" <aws@iti.org>
Subject: Hey Sherz! (For real!) Cost of LEO (Long)
Newsgroups: sci.space
In article <4JUN199318001896@judy.uh.edu> wingo%cspara.decnet@Fedex.Msfc.Nasa.Gov writes:
>>>What about scheduling of the manufacturer for the increased temporary
>>>production rate?
>>Somehow I don't think the manufactures wouldn't mind.
>I did not say they would mind, but as you know there is an aspect of
>scheduling involved,...
Sure that adds costs but those are dwarfed by the huge cost of using
the Shuttle. Look, Dennis, if it where actually as cost effective as
you say and if delays where as expensive as you think then Shuttle
would be doing a lot more satellite rescues and us taxpayers woldn't
need to shell out huge subsidies for it.
>>Since few if any avail themselves to this option and the only ones who
>>do, do it with huge subsidies, this clearly isn't a factor.
>I think that some of the satellite operators insure themselves relative to
>loss of revenue of a lost bird.
Which they seem to find preferable to shelling out half a billion $$ for
a Shuttle flight.
>I guarantee you and you well know that any
>company that loses a bird is put in a bad position cash flow wise. This
Rarely. The companies in question apparently don't feel the need to
hurt their cash flow even more by rescuing the satellite (unless, of course,
we taxpayers can be suckered into picking up the tab).
>revenue loss is critical in some cases as was shown by the Japanese DBS
>vendors when they lost several satellites in a short time a year or two ago
You will note that they lost several satellites in a row. A very unlikely
occureance and I don't know of another example. BTW, in spite of this
critical problem, they didn't mount any rescues did they? If rescue
with Shuttle was such an attractive option as you claim surely they
would have.
>So I submit that loss of revenue is a major factor in some cases.
Yet their actions show it isn't so major a factor that they consider
satellite rescue (unless somebody else pays for it).
>I bet that
>in the case of some of the start ups like Tongasat this would be devastating
>to the company existance.
True enough. You pay your money and take your chances. Of course, paying
twice the satellite on orbit value for a replacement seems to be worse.
>Oh I have been waiting for you to make this wonderful comment again. Look at
>either the May 9-16 or the one before or after, I forget which and look at
>how GM REALLY does things, not the Allen version of how they do things.
>In this article, which also talks about the new Crysler small cars, it is
>stated that GM totally wrote off the development costs of the car and the
>plant that they built to build the Saturn line.
This was covered before when Mary Sharfer brought up Concord. Sure
companies sometimes write off development costs. That however, is far
different from what you are saying. GM wrote off the costs as a last
resort and as an admission of failure. You want to write off costs to
make a failure look good. GM is open about it, your covert. Finally, if
GM does this too often, it will ceace to exist. The way you want to run
space, it just gets bigger and bigger and produces less and less. Failures
are swept under the rug so nobody gets hurt.
It is also very rare for this to happen and tends to get you very negative
articles in the Wall Street Journal and you get embarasing questions from
the stockholers. YOu want to write expenses off to avoid negative articles
and embarasing questions. The former makes companies stronger, your approach
makes them weaker.
>This is the only way that
>GM will ever be able to claim (according to the article) that the Saturn
>will make money. This is in addition to the fact that in order to make a
>profit on an INCRIMENTAL basis, Saturn must meet the 300,000 a year sales
>target.
In other words, their break even point is 300K vehicles. That means they
need to sell that many to pay for their overhead. Again very different,
they need to recover their day to day expenses, you want to fiddle with
the books so us taxpayers get the bill instead of the users. Not the
path to an independent sulf sustaining space infrastructure.
>(PS I really like Allen and I hope you take this in the spirit of debate and
>not as flame)
Ditto. There was a time when I wold have agreed with you 100%. After a
few years on the job I saw my mistakes and I'm sure you will as well.
>>Until then the market for satellite rescue/repair must be regarded as
>>non-existant (without huge taxpayer subsidy of course).
>Correct this to say that Allen does not consider it due to the above and your
>clearly discerned biases.
No, it's obvious the satellite makers, launchers, and users don't see a
market either. Granted, however, they do see a small market for taxpayer
funded rescues, but not when they must pay the cost.
Now with cheap and routine space access, that will quickly change.
>>After you graduate Dennis and begin work in the real world, you will find
>>your employer doesn't consider proper cost accounting a 'diatribe'. Your
>>contract administrators will get most upset with you if you do.
>See the above to refute your statement.
Sorry Dennis but what GM did was proper accounting of costs. They paid
for their losses out of their own pocket, learned a lesson, and are stronger
for it. You want to use improper cost accounting, make somebody else pay
the losses, avoid learning from the experience, and make NASA weaker for
it. Similar actions, very different effects.
>Allen you just go on and play your little accounting games.
These are not games Dennis. They are mechanisms which serve many purposes
and are key to making the free market work and maintaining the material
strength of the nation.
If you want a place where they are games, to to the Soviet Union and
you'll have as much luck as they did.
>>I simply ask if you would consider your car reusable if it acted like
>>Shuttle. don't blame me if your uncomfortable with the answer.
>This is not a proper comparision and you know it. Cars have been around for
>100 years, High performance Spaceflight for only 25. Take a look in
>history at Cars circa 1900 if you want a just comparision to the shuttle in
>terms of a system comparision.
Fine. Around 1900 I could have bought a Stanley Steemer or even a Ford.
Both could go for months without maintenance. They certainly qualified
as reusable by today's standards. They may not be as reliable, but they
where re-usable. I could drive it to work and back again for days and
days. Cars pass the re-usability test, propeller driven aircraft met
the test, jet driven aircraft met the test.
Shuttle doesn't so do't get mad at me just because you don't like the
answer.
>Totally missed the point here. The very early Jet engines were terrible as
>it pertains to reliabilty. As Mary to ask the old timers at Edwards or
>read about the early engines. None lasted more than 10 hours with out
>extensive rebuild.
Only true for about three of four years. By ten years, they where in
routine use.
>>But if you want reusable rocket engines, I suggest you look at the RL-10.
>>This 30 year old engine is being used over and over again without
>>maintenance in the current DC-X tests.
>So what.
Your the one who brought it up. You said we shouldn't expect re-usability
this early in development yet the re-usable engine has been around for
ten years.
>A volkswagen engine lasts longer than a ferrari engine.
Exactly. We power our spacecraft with Ferrari engines when we should be
using Voldwagen engines.
>It is
>a matter of performance. RL-10 cannot be scaled up and maintain that
>reliabilty an you know it. Just ask the Japanese engineers on LE-7.
I would rather ask the makers of the RL-10. They have been upgrading
its power and reliability continuously over the past 25 or so years.
In a couple of years you will be able to buy the newest RL-10 which
will have twice the thrust of the current RL-10 and be about 5 seconds
of impulse better than the SSME.
RL-10's have been and can be scaled up.
>>It can be done, just not the way NASA is doing it.
>I want to see some numbers on total firing time for engines without
>re-inspection. Until you come forth with data you are wasting time.
I posted this stuff you last time we went around on the RL-10. Look
it up yourself.
>>>There was no answer as you well know at the presentation about the RL-2000
>>>for the DC-series.
>>I thought he gave an excellent answer. Most of the RL-200 engine exists
>>today. The only open questions can be ansered for $50M.
>Wrong.
so which open questions won't be ansered?
>He said that they anticipated no problems. Ask the Japanese if they
>anticipated any problems on the LE-7.
I prefer to ask the makers of the engines. They have a lot of experience
with upgrading the RL-10 on time and on budget. Maybe it won't work this
time, but you couldn't tell from the track record.
>Go ahead ask the LE-7 folks. It is over budget by a factor of three and
>still rising according to Av Week and Space News.
Dennis, you can't claim a project will fail just because another project
failed. LE-7 problems are mainly related to the expander cycel they
selected.
By the same logic we should conclude that your satellite will fail
because the Shuttle tether experiment failed.
Allen
--
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Lady Astor: "Sir, if you were my husband I would poison your coffee!" |
| W. Churchill: "Madam, if you were my wife, I would drink it." |
+----------------------10 DAYS TO FIRST FLIGHT OF DCX-----------------------+
------------------------------
Date: 6 Jun 93 19:35:40 GMT
From: Paul Dietz <dietz@cs.rochester.edu>
Subject: LE-7 orrection (was Re: Hey Sherz!...)
Newsgroups: sci.space
In article <1993Jun6.190440.24955@iti.org> aws@iti.org (Allen W. Sherzer) writes:
>> Go ahead ask the LE-7 folks. It is over budget by a factor of three and
>> still rising according to Av Week and Space News.
>
> Dennis, you can't claim a project will fail just because another project
> failed. LE-7 problems are mainly related to the expander cycel they
> selected.
Allen: you mean the staged combustion cycle they selected. SSME and
now LE-7 show this one is a bitch to develop. The expander cycle seems
much less demanding, in part due to the low turbine temperature
(only 100 C in the RL-10). That also helps reusability no end.
Paul
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 1993 15:51:52 GMT
From: Gary Coffman <ke4zv!gary>
Subject: manifest destiny = US getting uppity again
Newsgroups: sci.space
In article <C867ry.IHM@zoo.toronto.edu> henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes:
>Early in the morning of July 4, when most everybody down there is preparing
>to celebrate the anniversary of your insurrection against lawful authority,
>most of the Canadian Armed Forces will move swiftly to seize North Dakota.
>They will bypass and contain major population centers, which could offer
>lengthy resistance anyway, and stick to seizing strategic assets.
You mean you're going to send *both* Boy Scouts? The 4th probably is a
bad time though, their dogsleds are going to have a hard time of it.
Even *North* Dakota is south of the permafrost.
>:-) :-) :-) :-) :-) :-) :-) :-) :-) :-) :-) :-) :-) :-) :-) :-) :-)
Ditto.
Gary
--
Gary Coffman KE4ZV | You make it, | gatech!wa4mei!ke4zv!gary
Destructive Testing Systems | we break it. | uunet!rsiatl!ke4zv!gary
534 Shannon Way | Guaranteed! | emory!kd4nc!ke4zv!gary
Lawrenceville, GA 30244 | |
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 1993 20:38:52 GMT
From: Nick Janow <Nick_Janow@mindlink.bc.ca>
Subject: mass drivers
Newsgroups: sci.space
dietz@cs.rochester.edu (Paul Dietz) writes:
> However, remember that the acceleration portion was only one part of the
> system: there was also to be a part downstream of the accelerator where
> (lateral) velocity errors were measured and corrected. I've always had the
> impression that was one of the more problematic parts of the system (the
> mass catcher at the far Lagrange point was another).
That sounds like a basic--though not trivial--engineering problem, and
there's no reason to believe it would be particularly difficult to solve. I
can imagine that the driver would originally have only moderate accuracy, but
after a few years of operation, be extremely accurate. You could have
several stages of correction; the last might be a laser system which
vaporizes small patches off the side of the container, giving tiny
corrections. All this is tied into a neural net with laser tracking, solar
wind measurements, etc.
--
Nick_Janow@mindlink.bc.ca
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 1993 16:11:45 GMT
From: Gary Coffman <ke4zv!gary>
Subject: Why are SSTO up-front costs rising?
Newsgroups: sci.space
In article <1993Jun6.004444.11618@iti.org> aws@iti.org (Allen W. Sherzer) writes:
>NASA has serious problems executing large programs. I think you would
>agree with that statement. SDIO, however, has a long history of using
>streamlined procurement, learning from past mistakes, and focusing on
>the problem.
Huh? The now defunct SDIO didn't have a long history of anything,
certainly not of managing $5 billion dollar aerospace projects.
Besides, that fine SSF contractor MacDac is doing the work, not
some brass hats in an office somewhere in the Pentagon. And MacDac's
record on large projects isn't spotless. Their current financial
situation is testimony to that. Give the program to Lockheed and
the CIA, *they* have a track record of bringing in high tech aerospace
in record time, from go ahead to flight in 8 months for U2.
(Note tongue somewhat in cheek here.)
NASA has a record of managing many modest projects well with limited
funding, see the second 'A' parts. Only when the Congressional
checkbooks are opened too wide does the process seem to bog down.
The price of failure becomes too high. Then the managers become timid
and intent on CYA reviews and studies, and the contractors become
inordinately greedy as they spy a large opening into the taxpayer's
pockets.
Gary
--
Gary Coffman KE4ZV | You make it, | gatech!wa4mei!ke4zv!gary
Destructive Testing Systems | we break it. | uunet!rsiatl!ke4zv!gary
534 Shannon Way | Guaranteed! | emory!kd4nc!ke4zv!gary
Lawrenceville, GA 30244 | |
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 1993 19:17:51 GMT
From: "Allen W. Sherzer" <aws@iti.org>
Subject: Why are SSTO up-front costs rising?
Newsgroups: sci.space
In article <5JUN199322002826@stdvax.gsfc.nasa.gov> abdkw@stdvax.gsfc.nasa.gov (David Ward) writes:
>Forgive me if this has come up before, but I am interested in your list
>of the correct rules that the DC-X program is following, and that the
>general NASA culture does not. I'm pretty sure I've picked up some of
>your (and others') list, but I'd appreciate a summary (this might become
>a FAQ). I'd also like to know a bit more about what you thought of
>Ken Jenks' appropriate article on improving the NASA infrastructure
>(and Ken, a belated "Congratulations" on becoming an engineer again).
I thought Ken't article was excellent. The main thing I think is missing
now (and was present during Apollo) was the sense of vision. A source
sent me a memo written by the NASA Adminsitrator Truly to Senator
Michulski on the priorities at NASA. His first priority was keeping
everybody at NASA funded. Second was Shuttle. Station was third.
It bothered me that his first priority was was to keep the empire going
and second was to fly an expensive operational system. Only his third
priority had anything to do with research.
>I would start a summary of your list (of the things DC-X is doing right):
>1. Experimentation
>2. Small Core Team Atmosphere
>3. Streamlined Procurement
>4. Progressive Development (scaling up to DC-1)
I think this is 90% of it. I would emphasise that the requirements SDIO
specified for SSTO would fit on the back of an envelope. The program
was administered at SDIO by two guys. A similar program at NASA (or the
rest of the government) would have the requirements specified over
thousands of pages. Hundreds of NASA people would be involved. Where the
SDIO monitors just looked for things wrong, NASA would be actively
dictating everything about the program. The result is a program which
costs several times as much and built to serve political, not technical
goals.
Allen
--
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Lady Astor: "Sir, if you were my husband I would poison your coffee!" |
| W. Churchill: "Madam, if you were my wife, I would drink it." |
+----------------------10 DAYS TO FIRST FLIGHT OF DCX-----------------------+
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 1993 19:35:24 GMT
From: "Allen W. Sherzer" <aws@iti.org>
Subject: Why are SSTO up-front costs rising?
Newsgroups: sci.space
In article <1uslvqINNslb@phantom.gatech.edu> matthew@phantom.gatech.edu (Matthew DeLuca) writes:
>>Why does that bother you?
>Allen, knowing that I am a Delta Clipper supporter, why do you think that
>would bother me?
Well it seems to bug you that I don't like Shuttle but do like SSTO. The
fact that they are very differently run programs doesn't seem enough to
you. I just do't see why.
>For what it is worth, this particular debating tactic of
>yours (Why does that bother you? Why do you oppose reduced cost?)
I'm not saying reduced costs bothers you, what I think bothers you is
that I like SSTO and not Shuttle. You seem to think I decided beforehand
that I would like one and not the other.
>particularly annoying; is that something you picked up in a high school
>debate class somewhere?
I never took debate class or was on a debate team.
>>You missed it. I 'bless' projects because they work, not the other way
>>around. I 'bless' results.
>I find this hard to believe, since you've been bouncing up and down about
>DC-X since long before they started working on hardware.
Based on the rules being used by SDIO, I was optimistic (which is being
born out). But I said over and over again that there was a chance of
failure and that I would drop the program like the poverbial hot
potato if it turned to pork.
>Now that I am done abusing you I feel much better. :-) Back to the real
Glad I could help! :-)
>I was thinking about that table you posted the other day, amortizing
>development costs across a number of launches. Since an eventual goal
>(I assume) is to sell the DC-1 vehicle commercially, and the government is
>going to eat the R&D costs, it seems like it might make more sense to
>forget about the R&D costs when calculating launch costs, and just amortize
>the hardware cost (plus a profit for MacDac) versus launches. How does
>this thinking change the per-launch cost?
First of all, I don't think government should eat the DDT&E. There is no
need for them to. If and when a commercial verson is made I wold expect
MacDac to pay their share fo the development. I don't have a double
standard, I hold DC to the same accounding methods I would hold Shuttle.
That being said, a rough guess would be $250/pound if DDT&E was written
off. This again, assumes the best case numbers of 50 flights per
vehicle, 24K to LEO. I have some numbers better suited to this sort of
calculation from a NASA briefing but haven't plugged them into my
spreadsheet yet. However, those numbers would show even lower costs.
finally, these numbers are costs and not prices. What price is charged
will depend on the market and I don't want to speculate on that just yet.
They would price it so it is just a bit cheaper than ELV's and make a ton
of short term $$ or they cold price it to build the market and make more
over the long run.
Allen
--
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Lady Astor: "Sir, if you were my husband I would poison your coffee!" |
| W. Churchill: "Madam, if you were my wife, I would drink it." |
+----------------------10 DAYS TO FIRST FLIGHT OF DCX-----------------------+
------------------------------
Date: 6 Jun 1993 16:12:33 -0400
From: Matthew DeLuca <matthew@oit.gatech.edu>
Subject: Why are SSTO up-front costs rising?
Newsgroups: sci.space
In article <1993Jun6.193524.26047@iti.org> aws@iti.org (Allen W. Sherzer) writes:
>In article <1uslvqINNslb@phantom.gatech.edu> matthew@phantom.gatech.edu (Matthew DeLuca) writes:
>>For what it is worth, this particular debating tactic of
>>yours (Why does that bother you? Why do you oppose reduced cost?)
>I'm not saying reduced costs bothers you, what I think bothers you is
>that I like SSTO and not Shuttle. You seem to think I decided beforehand
>that I would like one and not the other.
I should have been more clear; it's not the exact question you asked that
bothers me, it is your standard tactic of making statements and simultaneously
putting words ("I support lower-cost access to space. Why don't you?") in
other peoples' mouth that drives me batty.
>>particularly annoying; is that something you picked up in a high school
>>debate class somewhere?
>I never took debate class or was on a debate team.
Maybe you should have. :-)
>First of all, I don't think government should eat the DDT&E. There is no
>need for them to. If and when a commercial verson is made I wold expect
>MacDac to pay their share fo the development. I don't have a double
>standard, I hold DC to the same accounding methods I would hold Shuttle.
I think we have different views on government financing things. For myself,
I consider the government a black hole of finance (I am sure we agree here!)
and any money it spends can be considered gone. Since the R&D money is gone
forever and the group making and selling the hardware (MacDac) is not the
group who spend the money in the first place (the government) it makes sense
to write it off. Making MacDac pay back costs of R&D would be an effective
heavy tax on Delta Clipper production; the absolute worst possible thing that
could happen.
>That being said, a rough guess would be $250/pound if DDT&E was written
>off.
This looks a lot more like the numbers I was hearing at the start of the
project...I feel better now. :-)
--
Matthew DeLuca
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta Georgia, 30332
uucp: ...!{decvax,hplabs,ncar,purdue,rutgers}!gatech!prism!matthew
Internet: matthew@phantom.gatech.edu
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End of Space Digest Volume 16 : Issue 694
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